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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2010, a household survey was carried out in Hungary among 1037 respondents to study consumer 
preferences and willingness to pay for health care services. In this paper, we use the data from the 
discrete choice experiments included in the survey, to elicit the preferences of health care consumers 
about the choice of health care providers. Regression analysis is used to estimate the effect of the 
improvement of service attributes (quality, access, and price) on patients’ choice, as well as the 
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differences among the socio-demographic groups. We also estimate the marginal willingness to pay 
for the improvement in attribute levels by calculating marginal rates of substitution. The results show 
that respondents from a village or the capital, with low education and bad health status are more driven 
by the changes in the price attribute when choosing between health care providers. Respondents value 
the good skills and reputation of the physician and the attitude of the personnel most, followed by 
modern equipment and maintenance of the office/hospital. Access attributes (travelling and waiting 
time) are less important. The method of discrete choice experiment is useful to reveal patients’ 
preferences, and might support the development of an evidence-based and sustainable health policy. 
 
Keywords: discrete choice experiment, service valuation, health care, user fees, Hungary 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Previous qualitative studies suggest that consumers are not satisfied with the quality of health 
care services provided by the social health insurance in Hungary (Baji et al. 2011a; Baji – 
Gulácsi 2010). They mostly complain about long queues, long waiting times, lack of personal 
attention, poor maintenance of the health care facilities and shortage of equipment. The low 
quality of health care services provided by the social health insurance is often explained by 
the financial difficulties (continuous debts) of the health insurance fund, as well as by the lack 
of financial and human resources in the health care facilities.  
At this moment, most of the health care services covered by social health insurance are 
provided free of charge.
2
 However, those consumers who want to obtain services with better 
quality or access are either paying informally for health care services or use private services 
(Baji et al. 2011a). To maintain or improve the quality of the services provided by social 
health insurance and to meet consumers’ expectations, the increase of private spending on 
health care seems to be inevitable. The pressure on the government to control health care 
expenditure is already significant and an increase of public resources for health care financing 
is not expected in the near future (Gaál et al. 2011). However, according to the conclusion of 
the qualitative study mentioned above, health care consumers are not against contributing to 
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the cost of the health care services (by paying formal user fees/co-payments) if these services 
are provided with good quality and access (Baji et al. 2011a; Baji – Gulácsi 2010). 
The objective of this study is to examine the preferences of the health care consumers 
for quality, access and price attributes of health care services. In particular, we use the method 
of discrete-choice experiment (DCE) to study the relative importance of various service 
attributes to consumers, as well as the value that consumers attach to the improvements in 
service quality and assess. We also estimate how relative attribute importance and 
improvement valuation differ among the socio-demographic groups. For the analysis we use 
data from a national survey carried out in 2010 in Hungary among a representative sample of 
1,037 respondents. 
Our study is useful for Hungarian policy makers to establish the relative importance of 
co-payments by patients for health care. This can be a starting point to make patient charges 
acceptable for the public. The results are also useful for health insurance representatives to 
plan new products in the private health insurance market, as well as to prioritize the quality 
and access improvements of current products. This study also serves as an example of how 
the results of DCE can be used to inform health care actors and can be incorporated in policy 
planning. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a short overview of the DCE 
method. Next, we present the data collection, and the design of the DCE applied in our study 
as well as the survey results. Finally, we discuss our results and draw conclusions for policy. 
 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DCE METHOD 
 
Stated preference methods (e.g. DCE and contingent valuation) are used to elicit consumer 
preferences when consumer behavior is not observable, for example when the market for a 
given good/service does not exist or is still being developed. In this case, preferences can be 
derived from surveys where consumers are presented with hypothetical options and are asked 
to state their preferences for these options (Castello 2003).  
Stated preference methods are frequently applied within the framework of cost-benefit 
analysis, mainly in the field of health, environmental and transport economics, to advise on 
the social desirability of providing various commodities and services using public resources 
(see Hanley et al. 2003; Lancsar – Louvier 2008; Ryan et al. 2001; Ryan – Gerard 2003; 
Telser – Zweifel 2002; Vroomen – Zweifel 2011).  
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In this study, we focus on the DCE method. The main objective of the DCE method is 
to elicit the preferences of consumers for a given benefit. Respondents are faced with 
hypothetical choice sets (sets of profiles) of goods and services characterized by certain 
attributes. Each profile is a bundle of selected attributes with specific levels. The profiles 
differ from each other in the levels of their attributes. The respondents are asked to choose the 
profile that they prefer most.  
It is assumed that an individual derives unique utility from each attribute level. It is 
also assumed that respondents evaluate the utility that they expect to derive from a 
product/service by combining the utility that they expect from each attribute characterizing 
the given product/service. Consequently, respondents choose the profile that they associate 
with the highest level of utility. Thus, the respondents’ preferences for a given profile contain 
information about the overall utility that respondents expect to derive form that profile. In this 
way, the results of a DCE are used to elicit the relative importance of attributes to 
respondents, to examine the effect of improvements of attribute levels on the respondents’ 
choice, and to estimate the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between non-price and price 
attributes. The MRS is seen as an indicator of the marginal willingness to pay for a change in 
the non-price attribute, i.e. the increase in patient charges that compensates for the 
improvement of a non-price attribute assuming a constant utility level. We should highlight 
that the marginal willingness to pay derived from DCE should be used with caution and 
cannot be seen as actual amounts that respondents are willing to pay (e.g. Ryan – Watson, 
2009). It is, usable in an ordinal perspective to set investment priorities.  
The DCE method is broadly applied in the field of economic evaluation of specific 
health care products, procedures or programs (i.e. health technology assessment). The 
application of the method for the assessment of health policies is however limited. In this 
paper, we demonstrate how the method can be used to inform policy makers on consumers’ 
preferences for improvements in health care services and thus, on consumers’ willingness to 
accept official fees for health care.  
 
2. METHODS 
2.1. Data collection 
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We use data form a national survey, which was carried out as a part of an international 
research project.
3
 The objective of the survey was to provide quantitative data on past 
payments for health care services, data on preferences and willingness of the population to 
pay for health care services.  
Data collection was carried out in July 2010 via face-to-face interviews in the 
respondents’ homes using a standardized questionnaire. The aim was to have 1,000 completed 
questionnaires in Hungary representative for the population. The respondents were identified 
based on a multi-staged random probability method. First, the sampling points in the country 
were distributed proportionally to regions. Random route method was used to identify 8-10 
households per sampling point. The selection of the respondent within the selected household 
was done using the “last birthday” principle. It is proven by practice that the sample produced 
by this method does not differ significantly from the official statistical data on age, gender 
and other demographic parameters (Gaziano 2005; Oldendick et al. 1988). Altogether 1,376 
respondents were contacted, and 330 refused to complete the questionnaire. The response rate 
was 76%. Finally, we have 1,037 efficient respondent in the database.  
In this paper, we use the data from the two DCE experiments included in the 
questionnaire: the DCE focused on out-patient services (visit to a specialist) and the DCE 
focused on in-patient services (planned surgery).  
 
2.2. DCE design 
 
In each of the two DCE, the service (specialist visit or planned surgery) is presented to the 
respondents in the form of alternative profiles that contain combinations of attributes of health 
care services (see Table 1). The selection of attributes and attribute levels are based on focus 
group discussions, where the participants described their expectations about good quality 
health care services. Attributes of the services selected are referring to the quality of physical 
and human resources needed to provide care (i.e. health care facility, equipments, and 
personnel) as well as to the temporal, spatial and physiological access to services (i.e. waiting 
time, travelling time, staff attitude). These attributes correspond to the framework of Berki – 
Ashcraft (1980) on quality and access of health care services. We keep the number of 
attributes and their levels at a minimum to assure the feasibility of data collection.  
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Eight choice-sets for specialist services and eight choice-sets for hospital services are 
defined. Each choice-set contains one basic profile (that remained constant throughout all 
eight choice sets) and one alternative profile (see an example in Table 2). The alternative 
profiles are selected from all possible profiles (2
7
 = 128), by using an orthogonal main-effect 
fractional factorial design (Addelman 1962). The basic profile is chosen to minimize the 
overlap between profiles in a choice-set and to represent a potentially realistic situation - a 
low-price level, as well as 1 attractive and 1 unattractive level for each of the following 
aspects: health care personnel (attitude and skills), conditions (maintenance and equipment) 
and access (travelling and waiting).  
Respondents are asked to choose between the two options (basic profile and 
alternative profile) to indicate which specialist they would visit in the case of a major health 
problem with unfamiliar symptoms, and alternatively, which hospital they would choose in 
case of a planned surgery with not life-threatening conditions which requires 5 days stay in 
hospital (see Table 2). As explained in the previous section, it is expected that each individual 
derives unique utility from each attribute level and chooses the profile that maximizes his/her 
utility. For more information about the analysis of our DCE data see Appendix A. 
 
Table 1 
Attribute and attribute levels 
Specialist services   
 Attribute Attribute levels  
ATR1 Medical equipment 0 = Outdated  1 = Modern 
ATR2 Reputation and skills of the physician 0 = Unknown  1 = Known to be good 
ATR3 Maintenance of the office 0 = Outdated  1 = Renovated 
ATR4 Attitude of the staff 0 = Impolite  1 = Polite 
ATR5 Travel time to the office 60 minutes  15 minutes 
ATR6 Waiting in front of the office 45 minutes  10 minutes 
ATR7 Patient visit fee 10 Euro (2,850 HUF) 5 Euro (1,425 HUF) 
Hospitalization   
 Attribute Attribute levels  
ATR1 Medical equipment 0 = Outdated  1 = Modern 
ATR2 Reputation and skills of the surgeon 0 = Unknown  1 = Known to be good 
ATR3 Maintenance of the interior 0 = Outdated  1 = Renovated 
ATR4 Attitude of the staff 0 = Impolite  1 = Polite 
ATR5 Travel time to the hospital 3 hours  1 hour 
ATR6 Waiting time for the operation 4 months 1 month 
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ATR7 Patient hospitalization fee 100 Euro (28500 HUF) 200 Euro (57000 HUF) 
 
 
Table 2 
Example of choice set 
 
2.3. Analysis 
 
For the analysis of the DCE data, we use binary probit regression with random effects 
(software package LIMDEP 7.0). The choice of the profile (selection or rejection of the basic 
profile) is taken as a dependent variable. Initially, we include all attribute differences and all 
interactions (see the model in Appendix A) as independent variables (see independent 
variables in Table 3). Then, we reduce the model using a backward stepwise procedure where 
statistically insignificant independent variables are systematically removed from the model. 
This way, we obtain a reduced model that contains only statistically significant independent 
variables (where p≤0.10). 
We also calculate the MRS between non-price and price attributes, and we use the 
MRS as an indicator of respondents’ marginal willingness to pay and relative importance that 
respondents attach to a change in a given service attribute (e.g. Telser – Zweifel 2002; 
Vroomen – Zweifel 2011).  
 
3. RESULTS 
 
CARD: Choice of a physician – major health problems 
    
  Physician A Physician B  
 Medical equipment Modern Outdated  
 Reputation and skills of the physician Unknown Known to be good  
 Maintenance of the office Renovated Renovated  
 Attitude of the staff Impolite Impolite  
 Travel time to the office 60 min 15 min  
 Waiting in front of the office 10 min 45 min  
 Patient visit fee 5.- Euro 5.- Euro  
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Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. The average age of the sample population is 
46.3 years (SD=17.6), 46% of the respondents are men, 53.6% living in a town, 17.6% in the 
capital, the rest 28.8% is living in villages. Most of the respondents (67.0%) finished 
education at secondary level, and 49% of them are working. The average household income is 
167,470 HUF (sd = 93,960 HUF). The data represents the Hungarian population well.  
 
3.1. Socio-demographic characteristics 
 
The results of the DCE are presented in Table 4. All main effects of the attributes are 
significant, except for travelling time to the hospital in the case of hospital services. This 
means that all attributes included in the two DCE affect the choice of service irrespective of 
the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics. In general, better equipped and renovated 
physician office/hospitals, as well as skilled physicians and polite personnel are preferred. 
Shorter waiting time in front of the physician office and shorter waiting time for the operation 
as well as shorter travelling time to the physician office are also preferred. Travelling time to 
the hospital has a significant effect on the choice only for respondents with a household 
income of less than 250 Euro per month.  
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
Independent variable Measur
ement 
Value range Frequency 
n [%] 
Mod
e 
Med
ian 
Mea
n 
Sd 
Age Scale 18-92 - 20 47 46.3 17.5 
Young Dummy 0 = Over 30 
1 = Under 30 
822 [79.3%] 
215 [20.7%] 
- - - - 
Old Dummy 0 = Under 65 
1 = Over 65 
839 [80.9%] 
198 [19.1%] 
- - - - 
Gender Dummy 0 = male 
1 = female 
481 [46.4%] 
556 [53.6%] 
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1 - - 
Residence Ordinal 1 = village* 
2 = town 
3 = capital* 
303 [29.2%] 
552 [53.2%] 
182 [17.6%] 
2 2 1.9 0.7 
Education 
 
Ordinal 1 = primary or less* 
2 = vocational 
3 = secondary 
4 = tertiary* 
210 [20.3%] 
324 [31.2%] 
371 [35.8%] 
132 [12.7%] 
3 2 2.4 1.0 
Pensioner because of 
sickness 
Dummy 0 = No 
1 = Yes 
956 [92.2%] 
    81 [7.8%] 
0 0 - - 
Number of persons in the 
household 
Scale - - 2 2 2.7 1.3 
Household type Dummy 0 = living with others 
1 = living alone 
837 [80.7%] 
200 [19.3%] 
- - - - 
Bad perceived health Dummy 0 = Fair to perfect  
1 = Very bad to bad  
914 [88.1%] 
123 [11.9%] 
- - - - 
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High net monthly 
household income (rich) 
Dummy 0 = under 1,000 Euro 
1 = over 1,000 Euro 
917 [88.4%] 
120 [11.6%] 
- - - - 
Low net monthly 
household income (poor) 
Dummy 0 = over 250 Euro 
1 = under 250 Euro 
950 [91.6%] 
    87 [8.4%] 
- - - - 
 
The coefficients of the interaction terms of socio-demographic characteristics and the 
coefficients of the main effects of the attributes indicate the differences in preferences across 
the socio-demographic groups. The same sign of the coefficient of the main effect of an 
attribute and the interaction terms of the socio-demographic characteristics with this attribute 
indicate that this attribute has relatively greater impact on the choice of services in the given 
socio-demographic group compared to the base socio-demographic category. In case of 
opposite signs, the attribute’s influence on the choice is lower in the given socio-demographic 
group.  
 
Table 4 
Results of the regression analysis - DCE 
 
 Specialist services Hospital services 
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Constant 0.1031 0.0508 -0.0991 0.0507 
Medical equipment (ATR1) 0.4812 0.0419 0.2796 0.0358 
Reputation and skills (ATR2) 0.6373 0.0459 0.5960 0.0438 
Maintenance of the office /interior (ATR3) 0.4134 0.0387 0.3628 0.0444 
Attitude of the staff  (ATR4) 0.5455 0.0474 0.3535 0.0469 
Travel time (ATR5) -0.0072 0.0009 - - 
Waiting (ATR6) -0.0102 0.0012 -0.1473 0.0130 
Price (ATR7) -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
Medical equipment * OLD -0.2510 0.0711 - - 
Medical equipment * CAPITAL 0.2125 0.0726 - - 
Medical equipment * VILLAGE 0.1588 0.0819 - - 
Medical equipment * TERTIARY EDUCATION - - 0.2902 0.0868 
Medical equipment * PENSION DUE TO SICKNESS 0.1200 0.0687 - - 
Reputation and skills * FEMALE 0.1135 0.0492 0.0799 0.0459 
Reputation and skills * CAPITAL - - -0.4424 0.0750 
Reputation and skills * VILLAGE 0.1609 0.0671 - - 
Reputation and skills * PRIMARY EDUCATION - - -0.1815 0.0644 
Reputation and skills * TERTIARY EDUCATION 0.2191 0.0748 0.4776 0.0732 
Maintenance of the office /interior * PRIMARY EDUCATION - - -0.1468 0.0798 
Maintenance of the office /interior * YOUNG 0.2376 0.0717 - - 
Maintenance of the office /interior * CAPITAL - - -0.1838 0.0886 
Maintenance of the office /interior * TERTIARY EDUCATION - - 0.2325 0.0984 
Attitude of the staff  * VILLAGE 0.1458 0.0641 - - 
Attitude of the staff  * OLD -0.1390 0.0661 - - 
Attitude of the staff  * FEMALE 0.1367 0.0498 0.1416 0.0546 
Attitude of the staff  * CAPITAL - - -0.2961 0.0833 
Attitude of the staff  * TERTIARY EDUCATION - - 0.2997 0.0876 
Attitude of the staff  * RICH -0.3425 0.0991 -0.3587 0.1000 
Travel time * VILLAGE -0.0026 0.0015 - - 
Travel time * POOR - - -0.1509 0.0478 
Travel time * PENSION DUE TO SICKNESS -0.0038 0.0015   
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Waiting * CAPITAL -0.0050 0.0022 - - 
Waiting * VILLAGE   -0.0474 0.0199 
Price * YOUNG 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Price * OLD 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Price * CAPITAL -0.0003 0.0000 - - 
Price * VILLAGE -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 
Price * PRIMARY EDUCATION - - -0.0000 0.0000 
Price * TERTIARY EDUCATION 0.0001 0.0001 - - 
Price * BAD HEALTH -0.0002 0.0000 - - 
Price * RICH 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 
Price * LIVING ALONE -0.0001 0.0000 - - 
Price * PENSION DUE TO SICKNESS -0.0001 0.0000 - - 
Rho 0.1841 0.0162 0.2023 0.0170 
Observations 8296  8296  
Respondents 1037  1037  
LogLikelyhood -4792.93  -4810.75  
Chi2 235.54*   262.04*  
Note: all coefficients are significant, p<0.10 
 
The “reputation and skills of the surgeon” is a more important factor for women and 
respondents with a tertiary education than for the rest of the sample (for both physician and 
hospital services). At the same time, skills and reputation of the surgeon is a less important 
factor for respondents with primary education or respondents from the capital. The “attitude 
of the personnel” is a more important factor for women and respondents from villages when 
using specialist services compared to other socio-demographic groups. However, it is a less 
important factor for respondents over 65 and with a household income higher than 1,000 
Euro.  
Preferences for “medical equipment” differ across socio-demographic groups in the 
case of specialist services, while they are rather similar (i.e. interaction terms are not 
significant) in the case of hospital services (except for respondents with tertiary education). 
Preferences for the attribute “maintenance of the hospital interior” in case of hospital services 
also differ by socio-demographic groups, while we find no differences for the importance of 
the “maintenance of the office” in the case of specialist services. 
“Travel time to the physician office” is more important for respondents from villages, 
and respondents living on sickness-pension than for the rest of the sample. Also, we find no 
significant differences concerning the importance of “waiting time in front of the office” 
(except for respondents from the capital who have stronger preferences for a shorter waiting 
time than the rest of the sample). This is also the case for “waiting time for the operation”, 
which is a more important factor for respondents from villages than for other socio-
demographic groups.  
Regarding the price attribute, significant negative coefficients of the interactions 
between price and socio-demographic characteristics show that the choice of services by 
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members of vulnerable social groups is strongly affected by changes in the price attribute. 
Respondents from a village or from the capital, with bad health status, as well as those who 
are living alone and are disabled are more strongly affected by the price when choosing 
between specialist services. Similarly, for hospital services respondents from a village, with 
low education, who are living alone and disabled are more strongly affected by the price. 
We find that respondents under 30 or over 65 years are less affected by the price when 
choosing between services. Also, the choice of respondents with tertiary education and with a 
household income of more than 1,000 Euros per month is less affected by price changes in 
case of specialist services. 
 
3.2. Marginal rates of substitution  
 
We calculated the MRS for the different non-price attributes (see Figures 1 and 2). The MRS 
is higher for respondents below 30, with tertiary education, and with a household income 
higher than 1,000 Euros. It is lower for vulnerable social groups such as disabled and those 
with a bad health status. The MRS is indicative for the relative importance of attributes to the 
respondents, when choosing between health care services.  
In general, in the case of specialist services, respondents more value attributes 
associated with the characteristics of the health care personnel, i.e. the MRS of reputation of 
the physician in the base category is 7.2 Euros and the MRS of the attribute “attitude of the 
personnel” is 6.2 Euros. This means that if the specialist has a good reputation, health care 
consumers value the specialist visit higher (7.2 Euros more) compared to an unknown 
specialist. These attributes are followed by modern equipments and maintenance of the office 
(MRS = 5.5 and 4.7 Euros). Access attributes (travelling time, and waiting time in front of the 
office) seem to be less important attributes in the choice of consumers (MRS = 3.7 and 3.5 
Euros for the change from 60 minutes to 15 minutes of travelling time and 45 to 10 minutes 
waiting time in front of the office).  
In the case of hospital services, MRS shows that respondents value a higher skilled 
surgeon with a good reputation (MRS = 146.0 Euros) compared to other attributes. It is 
followed by the decrease of waiting time (from 3 months to 1 month) for the operation (MRS 
= 108.2 Euros) and also the attitude of the personnel (MRS = 86.6 Euros). Less important 
attributes are the interior of the hospital ward (MRS = 88.9 Euros), and the state of medical 
equipments in the hospital (MRS = 68.5 Euros). Travelling time to the hospital has a 
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significant role only in the choice of respondents from the lowest income category (where 
household income is less than 250 Euros per month). 
 
 
Figure 1. MRS in different socio-demographic groups (specialist examination) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. MRS in different socio-demographic groups (hospitalization) 
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4. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS  
 
In this paper, we have examined the preferences of the Hungarian health care consumers for 
health care services using DCE method. DCE method is frequently applied to examine 
patient’s preferences and to model the consumers’ choice at the hypothetical market. In our 
paper, we examine the preferences of Hungarian consumers for physician and hospital 
service, as well as the value that different socio-demographic groups in Hungary attach to the 
improvements of these services.  
We find that health care consumers in Hungary highly value improvements of health 
care services. This is in accordance with previous findings on the attitude of health care 
consumers towards co-payments (Baji – Gulácsi 2010, Baji et al. 2011a). 
Young and elderly consumers with tertiary education and with higher household 
income are willing to accept a higher price for the improvement of the quality of health care 
services. Previous studies have also argued that people with higher education are more likely 
to invest in their health (Becker 1967; Mincer – Polachek 1974; Tomini et al. 2011), while 
vulnerable social groups (e.g. consumers from a village, with primary education, with bad 
health status, those who are living alone or living on a disabled pension) are less willing to 
accept payments for the health care improvements. Consumers from the capital are also less 
willing to accept payments for improvements of the services. The explanation of this finding 
might be that consumers from the capital are already experiencing better quality of and access 
to health care services. Several studies have indicated that in Budapest, consumers have much 
better access to health care services than in other parts of the country (Belicza 2006; Vitray et 
al. 2011). 
Also, health care consumers value the quality attributes connected to the health care 
personnel the most (i.e. the reputation of the physician, and the attitude of the health care 
personnel). Medical equipments and the maintenance of the health care facility are also 
considered as important factors. However, waiting time in front of the office and travelling 
time to the health care facility are less likely to affect the choice of health care consumers. It 
seems that 1 hour of travelling to the specialist’s office and even 3 hours of travelling time to 
the hospital is acceptable for consumers. In Hungary, this means that consumers do not mind 
to travel to the capital to be hospitalized (as the capital is accessible within 3 hours from most 
part of the country). This might also suggest that the quality of the provided services differ 
between territories and confirm that health care consumers are not against travelling if they 
receive better quality care. A lower importance of access compared with clinical quality is 
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also reported in several previous studies (e.g. Acharya – Cleland 2000; Harris 2002; Pavlova 
et al. 2003). 
We also identify differences in the preferences by socio-demographic groups. Women 
in general value the attitude of the staff and reputation of the physician/surgeon relatively 
higher than men. People from the capital attach relatively lower importance to the attitude of 
the personnel and the reputation of the surgeon in case of hospital services, but put higher 
value on the state of medical equipment and a short waiting time in case of specialist services. 
Travelling time to the hospital is a significant determinant of the choice only for low-income 
households. They might be less able to afford travel costs. 
 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS  
 
The consumers’ preferences for the improvements of the quality of health care services and 
the current consumer dissatisfaction with the health care quality in Hungary call for additional 
resources in the Hungarian health care sector. Since the options to increase public funds are 
limited, it seems that the increase of private financing is inevitable. Our results might be 
useful for policy makers who consider the increase of private financing in health care to 
establish sustainable patient payment policies acceptable by the public. In the following we 
discuss the main factors which should be considered. 
 
 Need for quality measurement and monitoring 
In our study, we provide evidence that health care consumers in Hungary are ready to accept 
higher prices if the quality and/or the access of a given service is better (i.e. they attach less 
importance to patient charges than to service quality and access). Thus, there is a potential to 
implement patient charges, however fees/charges should provide in return improvements in 
quality and access. To be able to involve private payment channels in the funding of health 
care services, it is essential to define quality standards of health care services guaranteed by 
the social health insurance. At the moment in Hungary, the quality standards of the health care 
provision are not regulated and the quality of the provided services is not measured in 
practice. Experiences from western European countries should be used to set up quality 
measurements standards. For example, the “Health Care Quality Indicator” program of the 
OECD started in 2002 with the aim to compare the quality of health services in different 
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member states.
4
 A wide range of quality indicators have been developed to measure quality, 
which could help in the specification of health care services, and thus, it could be used in 
national legislation and drafting protocols. The quality measures should include the various 
dimensions of health care provision- the structure, process and the outcome of health care 
services (Donabedian 1966; 1982; 1988). These parameters should be related to the health 
care facilities (e.g. the number of beds in a room, how many patients share a 
room/toilet/bathroom, meals given to patients), access to health care (how many minutes to 
travel to the provider institution, how long to wait in the health care facility, length of the 
waiting-list), but even to the physicians (qualification requirements, experience, patients 
satisfaction). These parameters should also consider the outcome of the provided health care 
services (e.g. the infection rate, 30-day stroke and heart attack death rate). Such indicators 
should be used to define services included in the basic benefit package provided by the social 
health insurance. In Hungary, the concept of the basic benefit package has been discussed for 
a long time (Boncz et al. 2007; Dózsa et al. 2006). However, the sensitivity of this issue has 
held back policy makers from real actions. 
 
 Human resources and informal payments for health care services 
In our study, we find that health care consumers attach a higher value to the reputation of the 
specialist/surgeon and the attitude of the health care personnel compared to other attributes of 
health care services. Thus, according to consumer preferences, professional and personal 
skills should be remunerated. This finding indicates that priority should be given to 
investments in human resources. However, policies should consider that at the moment, health 
care consumers already express their willingness to pay and compensate health care personnel 
(mainly physicians) directly, by paying via informal channels (Baji et al. 2011a) These 
payments are widespread in the country, around 14% of the patients pay informally for 
specialist visits on average 35 Euros, and half of the patients pay informally in hospital care 
on average 58 Euros (Baji et al. 2011b). These informal payments constitute the major share 
of physicians’ income although they are rather unequally distributed between health care 
professions (Gaál et al. 2006). Policies on patient payments should consider that formal 
payments, if not well-implemented, might induce double financial burden of the health care 
consumers. 
 
                                                          
4
 See: http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3746,en_2649_37407_37088930_1_1_1_37407,00.html 
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 Equity considerations  
We also find in our study that vulnerable socio-demographic groups are more reluctant to 
accept high payments for health care services. It has been proven that such payments lead to 
unequal access to health care services (i.e. drop-out visits of these people), and with this, 
higher morbidity, emergency care admissions and mortality (Atella et al. 2005; Austvoll-
Dahlgren et al. 2008). Thus, policies on patient payments should consider the negative equity 
effects of increasing formal payments (charges) as these payments induce a relatively higher 
burden on vulnerable social-economic groups who are less able to pay for health care 
services. The exemption mechanisms for these groups should be carefully considered to 
prevent adverse effect on equity. This is an especially relevant issue in Hungary as the health 
status of the population is one of the worst among European countries (Gaál et al. 2011).  
 
 Patient payment policy 
To be able to improve the quality of health care services provided by social health insurance 
in Hungary, policies should aim to provide opportunity to pay for those who are willing and 
able to pay for the improvement in the quality of the services, and should reinvest these 
resources in health care provision. At the same time, policy makers should assure that the 
increase of private financing does not create adverse effect on equity and access. For this, a 
basic benefit package should be reconsidered based on scientific evidences and health care 
services provided by the social health insurance. Quality standards should be clearly defined.  
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Appendix A  
Theoretical background of the DCE method 
 
Consumers choose between services based on their utility level. The utility driven by the service is the 
following: 
 
(1) 
 
Where 
U  
ij
 utility that respondent j associates with profile i  
X 
 i
  non-price attributes in profile i  
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P
  i
  price attribute in profile i  
S  
j 
 variables respondent j  
c  constant 
a, b model coefficients 
k number of non-price attributes 
n  number of respondent variables  
 
It is expected that each individual derives unique utility from each attribute level and chooses the profile that 
maximizes his/her utility. We suppose that the consumer choose the alternative profile in contrast to the basic 
profile, if the utility derived from the alternative profile is higher (or equal) to the utility derived from the basic 
profile. 
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where υ , μ random errors within and between respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
After the estimation of model parameters (
1
... k , p ) from (2) we can calculate the marginal rate of 
substitution between non-price (x) and price-related (p) health care attributes, which can be interpreted as the 
amount of money that respondents are willing to pay for one unit change in the attribute level to stay on the 
same utility level. 
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